Our collective condition
The society in which we live is unique and differs radically from past societies. The ways in which it differs deserve to be listed and highlighted:
(1) Compared with most societies, it is remarkably lacking in structure. Members of past societies in most cases had their roles thrust upon them, by birth or other factors which in turn were connected with birth. The maintenance of social order was largely in the hands of all kinds oflocal groups and hierarchies, and the individual seldom had much choice concerning his own location within these. By contrast, in our society, the associations located between the national state on the one hand, and the nuclear family on the other, are fairly weak, and their membership is generally optional. Economic bureaucracies may be powerful, but the occupational structure itself is not rigid, and men are not constrained to remain within anyone of them.
(2) Notwithstanding a certain recent decline, this society is pervaded by a work ethic. A person's dignity, identity, self-respect, personal relations and, in most cases, his income, depend on his work role and performance; they depend on securing employment and, in most cases, on performing well in it. As most persons are (by definition) middling in their performance, and as most tasks must be adjusted to the capacities of those who carry them out, a person's satisfactory performance depends largely on his social skills, his capacity to 'get on' with others, because the technical demands made on him are, roughly speaking, adjusted to his capacities.
This point is greatly reinforced by the nature of work in modern industrial society. 'Work' used to mean, once upon a time, shifting or modifying bits of matter. Nowadays, it has retained that meaning only for a diminishing category of unskilled manual labourers. For the paradigmatic or typical member of a developed industrial society, for the great majority, work means the manipulation of meanings and of people.
(3) Most developed industrial societies have no firmly held, officially espoused, overall doctrine concerning the nature of things and of man's place in the overall scheme. Marxist societies constitute a kind of exception to this, but in most of them Marxism is no longer taken very seriously. In as far as there is a general background belief, it could be called naturalism: the conviction that man is part of nature, that the processes which go on within him and around him are governed by the same laws as those controlling the rest of nature, that consequently any steps taken to aid a man in misfortune should use natural processes as levers, and that knowledge of what those processes are should come from the same source as other information about these topics -from science.
(4) Whilst the new form of work, and the mobile nature of the occupational structure, and the absence of other kinds of structure, ensure that man has much cause to be frightened of other men -because he depends on them for his acceptance, fulfilment, recognition, and no ascribed role ensures that he will obtain these automatically -at the same time, he has unlike his ancestors, little cause to fear nature. Citizens of developed countries on the whole expect not to go hungry, and expect to live out their full span. Technology ensures that the first expectation is normally fulfilled, and medicine in most cases ensures the latter. (5) Belief, ritual, personal relations and hierarchy, therapeutic and soteriological practices, all fail to reinforce each other in this society. Strong affect towards special persons, respect for authority, belief in theory, safe redoubt or bolthole in a crisis and promise of relief-we experience all these, but we experience them separately, in isolation, in a way which disjoins them from each other. Strong feeling, reverence, subordination, ritual excitement, belief, moral support -all these once upon a time reinforced each other. They dovetailed with each other in coherent culture. They do so no longer. Our most general and cognitively respected convictions have no rituals, and our rituals are unaccompanied by faith. Our hierarchies are functional and opportunistic and volatile, and not reinforced by reverence or social distance. Affect, conviction, hierarchy, comfort in distress -all these form no mutually supportive system. The psychiatrist's situation This, in rough outline, is the social and ideological situation which modern man either has entered or is entering. If this diagnosis is correct, it has certain important implications for the role of psychiatry in modern society, and for the kind of theory and technique which we may confidently expect to appear in this discipline. Some psychiatrists fondly believe that the direction in which the discipline moves may be determined by, so to speak, the objective merits of various theories and methods. One does, of course, hope that the objective merits of theories and techniques will not remain unheeded in the development of the subject, and the hope is not wholly unrealistic. But the hope that only objective factors, sound evidence and therapeutic success, will be operative, does seem to me wildly unrealistic.
To put all this in simpler terms: many psychiatrists may be inclined to say that whilst they know that society wishes to thrust a priestly role onto them, that they themselves firmly repudiate such a role and will have none of it. I do not myself doubt the subjective sincerity of those who say this, but I very much doubt whether they will be allowed to indulge in this Paper read to Section of Psychiatry, 10 February 1987 0141-0768/87/ 012759-03/$02.00/0 Cl1987 The Royal Society of Medicine self-denying renunciation without let or hindrance. The forces going against it are very powerful indeed.
The first point to note in my diagnosis of the modern human condition is that modern man is very frequently in psychic trouble, more often than his predecessor, but that he is debarred from seeking aid in the quarters in which his less troubled predecessor usually found it. Where then is he to 100k?The knowledge he truly respects is science; medicine is part of science; psychiatry is part of medicine. The series of logical steps is wholly cogent. Psychiatry is also the part of medicine which specially deals with disturbed, malfunctioning conduct. The conclusion of this argument is inescapable: who but the psychiatrist can help the man in acute distress?
The appeal of psychoanalysis The phenomenal success of psychoanalysis in conquering the speech and thought of Western man in less than half a century in my view constitutes a remarkable piece of evidence in support of the general diagnosis offered here. What the theory and technique of psychoanalysis offered was the provision of a terminology and a therapeutic ritual ideally suited to the requirements of the age. It postulated a realm, the Unconscious, which has, roughly speaking, all the properties with which the Transcendent had once been credited: it is not directly accessible to ordinary mortals, who must seek the aid of privileged mediators to appease the menacing forces contained within it. It is the realm where our fate, our good or ill fortune, is determined. At the same time, however, the metaphysics of this crucial realm are strictly naturalistic: indeed, given the Darwinian incorporation of man within nature, it would be most surprising if no such realm existed. The differential capacity to penetrate into this realm, the privileged access granted to some, engenders a hieratic and therapeutic hierarchy whose authority is confirmed and sustained by -nay, is based on -strong personal emotion. The technique by which means this emotion is produced, and the hierarchy sustained, fits modern conditions to perfection: work and correct comportment for modern man require, above all, orderly and logical behaviour. By contrast, the free association enjoined by the technique as the privileged or only means of access to the dread realm, requires the precise opposite. It imposes the abandonment and inversion of our most cherished values and obligations.
Such a deep inversion signals, as usual, the presence of the Sacred: but it does so now in a strictly naturalistic, scientistic idiom.
The one-to-one nature of the therapeutic relation mirrors the structure of modern society, in which there are hardly any significant groups other than the intimate nuclear family and the national state. The meta-theory which explains the way in which normative guidance is extracted from a therapeutic process is entirely compatible with the anthropocentric, anti-transcendental temper of the time: the values or imperatives by which means it offers guidance well up from within, they are merely released and freed from obfuscation by the technique, and it is claimed that there is no question of any external imposition.
It was in this way that the priestly cuckoo's egg was placed in the psychiatrist's nest. It was not merely that the egg was there and had to be placed somewhere: the nest was also ideally suited for it and, on the whole, receptive to it.
The psychiatric reaction
Can it be thrown out? This is something about which I have grave doubts. Nevertheless, I have the distinct impression that there is a large body of psychiatrists who would be inclined to throw this cuckoo's egg out, their dominant attitude being something like this: our professional concern is with serious mental illness, not with personal maladjustment and social malaise; and our hunch is that the cause and hence the cure of serious mental illness is likely to be located within the neuropsychological area. Hence in some sense physical methods will be crucial in effecting cures. We would like to devote ourselves to this important and demanding task, and would be only too glad to hand over the diffuse pastoral role of offering guidance to socially disoriented humanity to others, notably to the rapidly growing and semiinstitutionalized profession of 'counsellors'. This is an understandable attitude, which attractively combines professional integrity with modesty. Attractive though it is, there will be considerable and weighty obstacles in the way of its sustained and consistent application. Let me mention some of them.
Suppose that indeed the deployment of broadly speaking physical methods in psychiatry progresses beyond its present stage, which seems to be marked by two general features: the methods are at present applied in a trial-and-error and ad hoc, 'empirical' spirit, i.e, that even when effective, there is no full and proper understanding of the manner in which they work. Secondly, these methods contain, rather than properly 'cure', mental illness. Suppose a breakthrough occurs which leads to the overcoming of either or both of these deficiencies. It is unthinkable, in my view, that such advances would then remain mere technical accomplishments 'within psychiatry'. They would, quite properly, be treated as fundamental discoveries which throw important light on our very conception of man, and must influence our notions on how to organize human life and society. It seems to me inevitable that general theories of man, implicitly or explicitly containing normative guidance, would be extracted from them. My guess is that some psychiatrists would inevitably take a leading part in the elaboration of such theories, and moreover, that such theories would, just as inevitably, confer some kind of crucial quasipriestly role and great moral authority on the psychiatrists who apply these newly powerful methods.
Another consideration is this: the boundary between serious and less serious mental disturbance is not a sharp one. Psychiatrists may wish to restrict themselves to the serious cases, but it is quite possible that in this society, the less acute but more pervasive disturbances constitute the most serious problem, that they are the main source of widespread unhappiness and social malfunctioning. If and when the kind of breakthrough envisaged does occur, the pressure militating against the restriction of the use of the new and powerful methods to 'serious' mental illness would be overwhelming.
Where next?
The nebulous boundary which separates serious mental illness from diffuse maladjustment ('neurosis' in current parlance) is related to another consideration: even if it came to be established that serious mental disturbance has physical causes, there can hardly be any doubt but that the sufferers from such serious ailments are also led by their condition into difficult and self-perpetuating social problem situations. The correct handling of these secondary effects of mental illness cannot possibly be an automatic corollary of 'physical' cures.
A purely 'materialist' or 'physicalist' theory of mental illness seems to me unlikely to be true. It may indeed be the case that the fundamental cause of serious mental illness is physical, and it may also be the case that existing psychotherapeutic methods have failed to substantiate their claims to effectiveness. But a purely physicalist theory of mental illness would have as its corollary that communication with sufferers through speech or social circumstance never has any effect or relevance. Such an extreme epiphenomenalist attitude to our semantic and social life can hardly be valid. Yet unless it is true, a sustained separation of serious and physicalist psychiatry from other methods of aiding suffering humanity simply does not make sense.
To look at it from another angle: the acute social need which is at present engendering the new 'counselling' profession does not operate in a vacuum. The doctrines in terms of which the counsellors are trained, and which is to guide their practice, may well contain cloudy truisms and nebulous platitudes. In fact, there can hardly be any doubt but that it does contain them. This enables practitioners to develop their practice in response to the concrete problems and in the light of their own capacities and inclinations, whilst still believing that their practice is legitimated by some genuine 'theory'. But all the same, there cannot but be an impulsion, in this society which in other spheres is habituated to high standards of cognitive competence, to seek out the best available knowledge and bring it to bear on the alleviation of human suffering. If powerful therapeutically effective knowledge does become available, there will be no way of insulating it from some anodyne 'counselling' guild and its principles of operation.
In brief, the existing attempt or attempts to create a priestly guild inside or alongside psychiatry may not have been too successful, in as far as its therapeutic record is poor. Or to putit more precisely, it may have been only too successful in producing a package which fitted in with current social needs and ideological climate -though at the same time, and perhaps for that very reason, it was none too successful in producing something which would meet exacting standards of either theoretical rigour or of therapeutic effectiveness. But it does not follow from this failure that psychiatrists can escape the pastoral or hieratic role which, whether they like it or not, is being thrust upon them by objective circumstance, because it is inherent in the very aspiration to secure knowledge which could make men whole.
